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NOTES.
FEDERAL CONTROL AcT-POWERS OF PRESIDE.N'T--CO-N-TROL

OF I-TR.ASTATE RATES.-By the Federal Control Act the President

was authorized, whenever in his opinion the public interest required, to initiate rates, fares, charges, etc., by filing same with
the Interstate Commerce Commission.; Sec. 15 provided "that
nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend, repeal, impair, or
affect the e.xsting laws or powers of the states in relation to taxation
or the lawful police regulations of the several states." On June io,
1918, certain passenger fares and baggage charges, and on June 25,
1918, certain freight rates, all of which were in excess of the rates
and charges previously authorized to be collected on the intraI Act of Congress. March 21, 1918, Sect. to.

NOTES

state commerce, were put into effect in the State of North Dakota
bv the President through his agent, W. G. McAdoo, the then
Director General of Railroads of the United States. The State of
North Dakota, ex rel. Langner, Attorney General, applied for
an alternative writ of mandamus commanding that the defendants,
the Northern Pacific Railway Co. desist from collecting the above
mentioned rates and charges. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Federal Control Act authorized theinitiation and
control of rates, wholly within the state, by the President, through
his agent, the Director General of Railroads of the United States.'
The decision of this case turned on the interpretation of the
Act (supra) rather than on its constitutionality, since the complete
character of the war power of the United States was undisputed.'
Nor was there any dirert precedent to aid the court in this interpretation. The Act failed to qualify "rates" by "interstate,"
but on the other hand, the authority of the state commissions to
continue to regulate their own intrastate rates was not specifically
denied. The contention of the State was that the Act expressly
reserved to the states their lawful police regulations, and interpreting these regulations in the broader sense, rate fixing control
was thereby included. 4 It was inconceivable to the court, however,
that Congress should have intended any interference by the states
in the federal control of railroads. In the words of Mr. Chief
Justice White, "On the face of the statutes it is manifest that they
were in terms based on the war power, since the authority they
gave arose only because of the existence of the war and the right
to exert such authority was to cease upon the war's termination.
To interpret, therefore, the exercise of the power by a presumption
of a continuance of a state power limiting and controlling the
national authorities, was but to deny its existence. It was akin
to the contention that the supreme right to raise armies and use
them in case of war did not extend to directing where and when they
should be used."
It would seem that the Supreme Court's reasoning must' be
sound in order that the Act should be made to accomplish its
purpose, and that the State's contention, that the reservation to
it of its "lawful police regulations" by Section i5of the Act (supra)
included rate fixing, must be untenable unless the all-embracing
power given to the President by Section io is to be destroyed.
In an exhaustive analysis of the Act (supra) Professor Henry
Wolfe Bikle's article in the Harvard Law Reviews anticipates the
conclusion of the court in the principal case.
C.W.B.T.
2 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. State of North Dakota ex rel. Langner, 39
Sup. Ct. Rep. 502 (1919).
3 Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493 (1870). Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U. S.366 (I917).
' Munn v. Illinois, 94 L. S. 113 (1876); Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co..
154 U. S. 143(i893).
&32V.L.R. 299 (igig).
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CRIMINAL LAW-FORMER CONVICTION OF ROBBERY BAR TO

PROSECUTION FOR MURDER.-The right not to be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense finds its foundation in the common
lawi and is guaranteed to the citizens of this country by the Constitution.2 However, it is often difficult to determine just when
this second jeopardy arises. This difficulty is evidenced by the
case of State v. Mowser,3 in the recent decision of which the Court
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, by a majority opinion, reversed the judgment of the supreme court of that state.
To facilitate a robbery, Mowser had hit his victim over the
head with a piece of lead pipe; but, contrary to his intention, the
blow killed. The accused was indicted for robbery, pleaded guilty,
and was convicted. Thereupon, the State put him on trial to
answer to an indictment for murder. He pleaded autrefois convict.
The question thus arose, whether the plea of a former conviction
of robbery is a bar to a prosecution on an indictment for murder,
where the homicide is the undesigned result in the perpetration
of the robbery. The final disposition of the case was that such a
Plea did constitute a bar; and judgment was entered in favor of
the defendant on that plea.
The earliest case4 in the jurisdiction, and evidently the only
one, which discusses this point, is named by the court as the authority for its decision. The accused in that case, ignorant of the
fact that anyone was in a dwelling-house, had set fire to it. It
burned to the ground; and the individual who was in the house
died in the flames. There was an indictment for arson and a
conviction. Later, there was an indictment for murder. Aitrefois convict was pleaded and was held to be good. "Our sense
of justice is shocked," said the court, "that a man shall be convicted and punished for the arson, with that measure of punishment which the laws mete out to those guilty of that crime; and
that afterwards, for a perfectly accidental and involuntary killing,'
he shall be liable to the same punishment of death which is inflicted
on the wilful and malicious murderer." Immediately, there are
apparent certain distinctions between that case and State v. Mowser. In the latter, far from being "accidental and involuntary,"
the death-blow was given intentionally and voluntarily to further
the perpetration of the crime. In the early case, "the killing
was a simple consequence of the burning"; but in State v. Mowser,
the killing could not be said to be the consequence of the robbery,
for up until the time the blow was struck, no robbery had actually
been committed. Again, in the state of facts, separate the robbery
from the killing and what is left is undoubtedly murder. But in
14 Blackstone, Comm. 335.

2 Constitution of the United States-Amend. V.
i o06 Atl. 416 (N. J. i919).
'State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. Law 462 (x832).
Italics my own.
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the early case. one of the deciding points was that "the killing
disconnected with the arson, is but involuntary homicide." From
this it is evident that the court was relying for authority on the
decision of a question arising from a situation which, while similar
in some respects, is essentially different and distinct from the case
in question.
The principle which is frequently enunciated in the case of a
plea of second jeopardy is that. where the facts necessary to convict on one indictment would not have convicted on the other,
a conviction on the first will not bar the prosecution of the second.'
So, an indictment and trial of a public official for accepting a bribe
from a corporation does not bar an indictment for receiving the
same money from an officer of the corporation? Nor will a conviction for drunkeness, and rude and boisterous language bar
an indictment for insulting language to an official.l This is because
"the evidence sufficient for conviction under the first charge would
not have convicted in the second indictment." Applying this test
to the case under discussion, since the evidence to convict under
the indictment for robbery would not have been sufficient to convict of murder, the legal identity of the offenses would seem to fail.
But the court denied this test, and named as the essential factor
the identity of the transaction out of which the offenses grow.
This is contrary to the current of opinion and to reason. For, an
individual may, at the same time and in the same transaction,
commit several distinct crimes, in which case a conviction of one
will not be a bar to an indictment for the other.' For instance,
it is possible for one to be convicted for selling liquor without a
license, and then convicted for selling liquor to a minor, though
in fact there is but one sale which is common to both indictments.10
It is all one transaction, but there is more than one offense. "To
render the plea of former conviction available, it must have been
for the same identical crime. The offense charged in both indictments must be identically the same both in law and fact."n1 Robbery is the taking, with the intent to steal, of the personal property
of another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by
violence or intimidation."- Murder is unlawful homicide with
malice aforethought.13 It is apparent that it is possible to perpetrate both in the same transaction; but it is equally apparent that,
from the identity of the transaction, There does not follow an
identity of offense sufficient to support the plea.
6Ex parte Gano, 132 Pac. 999 (Kan. 1913); Staples v. State, I75 S. W.
io56 (Tex. 1915).
7 Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344 (19o6).
$Gavieres v. U. S., 220 U. S.338 (1911).
1U. S. v. Harniison, a6 Fed. Cas. 165 (1876).
20Ruble v. State, 5I Ark. 170 (1888).
21People
1"

v. Bevins, 134 N. Y. S. 212, 1141
Clark, Crim. Law, 3rd ed., Sec. 1o5.
Sec. 70.

13Ibid.,

(1912).
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4
In its opinion, the court laid great stress on a statute"
which
declares that "any person who, in commiting arson, burglary,
rape, robbery, sodomy, or any unlawful act against the peace of
this state of which the probable consequence may be bloodshed,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder." The court argues
therefrom that "the perpetration of any of the named crimesis
an essential and integral part of murder in that class of case" where
death results in the commission of the lesser felony. And since
"this integral part of the principal offense is not a distinct affair,
but grows out of the same transaction, a conviction of the offender
for the lesser offense will bar a prosecution for the greater." The
statute which gives rise to this reasoning is simply declaratory of
the common law rule that where death results in the perpetration
of a felony, it is accounted murder. But this does not mean that,
because a murder results where only a robbery was intended, there
is a merger of the two felonies in one crime. Murder is not an
essential element of robbery, nor is robbery necessary to murder.
It is true that the two crimes grow out of the same transaction in
this case. But the test for the sufficiency of the plea of autrefois
convict is not whether the accused has been tried for the same act
but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.u
A trial and conviction for robbery is not a trial and conviction
for murder, even though that murder is the unpremeditated result
of the robbery. One cannot be convicted of murder under an
indictment for robbery, and, if convicted of robbery under such
indictment, has not been put in jeopardy for murder; because the
crimes are inconsistent and require a different measure of proof.
Therefore, a plea of former conviction of the robbery is not a bar
to the indictment for murder.
A.L.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

-

LIENS FOR STREET IMPROVE-

MENTS-PRIORITIES.-All private rights and interests in real property in a municipality are subject to statutory powers to levy
assessments for local improvements, and such levies may be made
superior to all other liens.' At common law no lien for general
taxes or special assessments existed. They are purely of statutory
origin. Therefore, while at common law, the priority of liens was
fixed by the time the liens attached to the subject matter, a different
rule as to priority may be adopted by the statute creating them.
The one exception to the common law rule, that liens take precedence in the order of time-the first in point of time being superior
-was a bottomry bond.2 And it was a principle of necessity which
entitled the bond of a later date to priority of payment over one
14 2 Comp. Stat. of N. J., p. 1779.
116 Morey v. Comm., io8 Mass. 433 (1871).
Towne of Rayne v. Harrel, 44 So. 330 (La. I9o7); Lybass v. Town of

Ft. Myers, 47 So. 346 (Fla. i9o8).
24 Kent's Commentaries 357 (3rd ed.).
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of a former date. The reason for this being, that the last loan
furnished the means of preserving the ship, and without it the
former lenders would have entirely lost their security.9
Special assessments, however, are a peculiar species of taxation. They stand apart from the general burdens imposed for
state and municipal purposes, and are governed by principles
that do not apply universally. In the case of liens for general
taxes, the rule is, that the last shall be first and the first last, and
the reason for this doctrine would apparently be, that in order to
meet the urgent financial necessities of the Government, an immediate collection of the revenue is imperative. But the same
considerations of public policy which obtain in aid of sustaining
the Government do not apply with respect to the enforcement of
the liens of special tax bills. While the theory of such special
assessments has its origin in the taxing power, the assessment
should not be considered as a tax in the true sense of that term,
but should be regarded as an assessment for which the owner of
the property has received an equivalent, or compensation, in the
form of improvements, which have operated to enhance the value
of his estate. Therefore, when we consider the fundamental distinctions which exist between special assessments for improvements, and the purposes for which general taxes'are laid and collected, it would seem that the rule regarding priority, which is
operative in the latter case, should not apply in the former.4 It
is in those cases where the state has not prescribed by statute
the time of commencement of the lien and whether or not one lien
shall have precedence over already existing liens of the same nature,
that the difficulty is encountered in determining the precise status
of the lien. In different cases the time of commencement is held
to be when the improvement is ordered; when the improvement is
completed; and when the amount of the assessment or charge is
fixed or determined., The conflict is even more pronounced in
the attempt to determine which lien shall have priority.
There is no doubt that a city lien for improvements is superior
to a prior mortgage, and the mortgagee takes his mortgage on
the property subject to the power of the city to require the property to bear its proportional expense of street construction, or
other similar work, and his mortgage lien is inferior to the contractor's for the work done.6 Such seems to be well settled law,
but in a recent case7 in which the court had to decide, without
zThe Rhadamanthe, i Dodson's Admiralty Reports 203 (1813); The
De Smet, io Fed. Rep. 483 (1881).
12 Cooley on Taxation, p. 1153 (3rd ed.); Parker-Washington Co. v. Corcoran, 129 S. W. 1031 (Mo. 1910).
5 Harper v. Dowdney, 21 N. E. 63 (N. Y. 1889); Knowles v. Temple, 49
Wash. 595 (i9o8); Cady v. Henes, 138 N. WV.1022 (Wisc. 1912); Hester v. Collector of Brockton, 217 Mass. 422 (1914).
6 Dressman v. Simonin, 104 Ky. 693 (1898); Auditor General v. Bishop,
125 N. NV. 715 (Mich. i9io); Gomeringer v. McAbee, 129 Md. 557 (1917).
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the aid of any governing statute, upon the priority of two street
assessment liens upon the same parcel of property, for work done
at different times on the street fronting the property, the last lien
imposed was held to be paramount. The decision was rendered
upon the theory that every right or interest in the property is
included in the subjection to the lien. A similar view prevails
in other jurisdictions, where the assessment last given is considered the paramount lien on the property, precisely as if it were a
general tax, collectable and enforceable as such, and when it once
attaches, affects all the interests in, or liens upon the property
without reference to the time when they were acquired.' A radical
modification of the preceding rule adopted by some courts makes
the superiority of the lien dependent on the time of entry in the lien
docket.$
The minority rule, however, that liens take precedence in
order of time, seems to be supported by far the more forceful reasoning. A municipality should have the right to displace the lien
which it has given under the law only when a statute so provides.
Another argument denying the superiority given by the majority
rule is that the property was assessed upon the theory of benefits,
and that every improvement of this character enhances the value
of the property to the extent of the assessment. From this reasoning it would follow, that the property was increased in value to the
extent of the assessment for both improvements, and the security
for the payment of the liens growing out of one was augmented
by the other. The last party had notice of the first improvement
and ought not to be placed in a better position than he would have
been, had the first improvement not been made.20 Certainly a
sale upon a junior lien should not extinguish a former lien of a
kindred character. Such a result would work great inconvenience
in many cases, while the purchaser of a junior lien can always pay
off the prior lien, which presumptively has increased the value of
his property to an extent at least equal to this amount., And
on the theory that the assessment is in rem against the property
itself, it would seem that where there was a merger and consolidation of properties, thereby resulting in conflicting equities, prinWoodill-Hulse Electric Co. v. Young, 182 Pac. 422 (Cal. i919).
slMorey v. City of Duluth, 75 Minn. 221 (1899); Richmond v. Williams,
102 Va. 733 (1904); Blackwell v. Village Coeur d'Alene, 13 Idaho 357 (1907);
Clade v. La Salle Realty Co., 81 So. 598 (La. i919).
'Clark v. City of Salem. 121 Pac. 416 (Ore. 1912).
" City of Elkhart v. Wickwire, 121 Ind. 331 (1889); Des Moines Brick
Mfg. Co. v. Smith, io8 Iowa 307 (1899); Bell v. City of New York, 66 App. Div.
N. Y. 578 (IgO9); Lincoln St. Ry. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 6i Neb. io9 (19o);
Brownell Imp. Co. v. Nixon, 92 N. E. 693 (Ind. i9io).
11Lincoln St. Rv. Co. v. City of Lincoln, supra; Scott and McClure Land
Co. v. City of Portland, 129 Pac. 276 (Ore. 1912): Act of June 4, P. L. 364 Pa.
1901. Sec. 2 makes taxes a first lien, while sec. 3, which provides for municipal
improvements, does not say that they shall be first liens-see the cases of Martin
v. Greenwood, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 245 (i9o5) and Oil City Bldg. and Loan Assoc. v.
Shanfelter, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 251 (1905).
7
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ciples of equity would decree that the liens follow the property
into the consolidated company, and one certain lien cannot take
precedence by reason of such consolidation over other liens already
existing. The courts do not appear to be sure of their ground, as
illustrated in the Missouri case of Redimer v. Perkinson," which
held that liens for special taxes take priority in the reverse order,
thereby squarely overruling a former case 13 in the same jurisdiction, although in neither case was there a question of statutory
construction involved.
J. H. C.
VENDOR AND PURCILSER - TxCU1mRAxcCES - BUILDING RsSTRIcrOS-SPECIFIC PERVORA-c.-Building restrictions inserted in a (iced for the protection of the residential character of
adjacent properties and the neighborhood will be enforced by the
courts of equity by an injunction., Such a restriction is held to
be an incumbrance on the land v'ithin the meaning of a covenant
in a deed to convey "free of incumbrances,"' as is any right existing in another to use the land, or whereby the use by the owner is
restricted. 3 But where the intent to protect the neighborhood
against the encroachments of industry has been defeated by a
change of the neighborhood itself from a residence to a business
district, the reason for equitable relief no longer existing, the injunction will be denied. 4 In England the operation of this exception to the general rule is limited to those cases where the change
has been brought about through the acts of the covenantee, or
those claiming under him.,
Given such a change in the character of the neighborhood
that such a covenant would no longer be enforceable in equity,
the question at once arises as to whether it should nevertheless
be held still to be such an incumbrance on the land as would justify
a vendee in a contract for the sale of land "free of all incumbrances"
in refusing to accept a deed subject to such restrictions. This
question was recently decided in the affirmative by a four to three
vote in the Court of Appeals of New York in a case which is one
of first impression.' In the words of the court, "if a person enters
into a contract for the purchase of real property, he cannot be
required to complete the purchase if its use is substantially restricted, although such restriction in the ordinary market would
not affect the price to be paid therefore."
z86 S. W. 1107 (Mo. Ix916).
Parker-Washington Co. v. Corcoran, supra.
114 Ruling Case Law, 397.
2 Whelan v. Rossiter. i Cal. App. 701 (1905).
12
13

v. Bruce, ix8 N. Y.319 (i89o).
4Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y.3H (1882); McClure
v. Leaycraft,
183 N. Y. 36 (1905); Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496 (1892).
5
Sayers v. Collyer, L. R. 28 Ch. D. 103 (1884); Osborne v. Bradley (i9o3)
3 Wetmore

2 Ch. D. 446.
4 Bull v. Burton, 124 N. E. iix (N. Y. 1919).
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The lot in question in this case was located on the westerly
side of Fifth Avenue between Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Streets
in New York City, and its contract price was nearly S19,7oo per
front foot on the avenue. The restrictive covenant bound the
grantee to not "erect or permit upon any part of said lot any
slaughterhouse, smith shop, forge furnace, steam engine, brass
foundry, nail or other iron foundry, or any manufactory of gunpowder, glue, varnish, vitriol, ink or turpentine, or for the tanning,
dressing or preparing skins, hides or leather, or any brewery, distillery, or any other noxious or dangerous trade or business." To
the dissenting judges it seemed "the height of absurdity to claim"
that such a restriction "is an incumbrance of such a character as
to prevent the passing of good title."
Though admitting that this covenant could no longer be
enforced by the granting of an injunction to restrain its violation,
the majority opinion is based on the argument that the purchaser
would be subject to an action at law for damages if it should be
violated, and thus the free use of his land cannot be said to be
unrestricted. But it is submitted that this question is not free
from doubt. In two reported cases, under facts substantially
similar to those in Bull v. Burton, it was held that the covenant
being no longer enforceable by injunction, it should no longer be
considered an encumbrance, but merely a cloud on title, which a
court of equity might remove by a decree declaring the restriction
at an end? In reaching this conclusion the courts found as a
matter of law that there no longer existed in anyone a right of
action for damages should there be a breach of the restrictive
covenants. While it is scarcely conceivable that any owrier of
the lot in question in Bull v. Burton would seek to make use of it
in a way which would violate the terms of the restriction, it is
equally difficult to see what right anyone would have to an action
for damages should such an event occur. None of the adjacent
lots had retained the residential character, which these restrictions
were designed to protect, and consequently no damages could
accrue. It has been repeatedly held that a mere cloud on title,
or remote possibility of a law suit on unsubstantial grounds, would
not justify a vendee in refusing to complete the contract.8 That
being the case, a more equitable result would have been reached
in the case of Bull v. Burton had the court decided that the building
: St. Stephen's Church v. Church of the Transfiguration, 2o N. Y. x
(i91!); McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372 (1915).
8 Bacot v. Fessenden, i3o App. Div. 8i9 (N. Y. i909), plaintiff's title
dependent on the decease without issue of the life tenant, a woman 70 years old;
Hayes v. Nourse, 114 N. Y. 595 (1889), where there was a lis pendens, having
no validity; Levy v. Iroquois Building Co., 80 Md. 30o (1894), a mere possibility
of a subsequent suit to set aside the conveyance to the vendor on the ground
of undue influence; Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa. 551(1856), a mortgage to secure an
annuity to a person who had long since died; Katz v. Kaiser, io App. Div. 537
(N. Y. 1896). affirmed 154 N. Y. 294 (1897), an unsatisfied mortgage apparently

barred by the Statute of Limitations.
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restrictions were no longer enforceable, that the covenant was a
mere cloud on title which would be removed by a court of equity
in an appropriate proceeding, and that the vendee was consequently bound to specifically perform his contract.
0.P. 2.
IMARRIAGE

-

ANNULMENT -

FRAUD -

ANTENUPTIAL INcON-

TrEr.,ci.-The dissolution of the marriage relation, aside from
being a problem of great social importance, is in its legal aspect
not free from difficulty. If a review of some of the decisions on
that subject, at this time, demands an apology, it is afforded by the
recent case of Gatto v. Gatto.' The plaintiff, in that case, informed
the defendant that lie would not marry her unless she was chaste,
whereupon she represented that she was. Shortly after marriage
and consummation she disclosed to him that she had been committing incest with her father for a number of years. A decree of
nullity was.awarded.
Were it not that we have but incompletely outgrown the
theory of our fathers that parties who marry take each other "for
better, for

worse,"

2

the desirability of the above decision would

hardly seem a matter for serious doubt. As antenuptial unchastity
is no ground for dissolution,3 it is to the realm of fraud that we must
look for the solution of this problem. Here we are at liberty to
choose between various theories, for the question whether fraud,
and what fraud, will vitiate a marriage contract, is raised in New
Hampshire for the first time.
Under the theory of the mediaeval Catholic Church that a
marriage once contracted under its sanction acquired a sacramental
character and could not be dissolved by human authority, the
Ecclesiastical courts could adjudge that two parties, though apparently married, never really were. No court could dissolve
what was in fact a marriage for any cause. The consent of the
parties was necessary to a valid marriage but it mattered not how
that consent was obtained. Fraud which procures "the appearance without the reality of consent" is ground for avoiding a
marriage. "But where there is consent, no fraud inducing that
consent is material."' The ecclesiastical law, being' part of the
law of England,' was the basis of the decision in Moss v. Moss, 6
1 o6 Atl. 493 (N. H. i919).
.2- According to the form of the marriage service of the Church of England,
each party takes the other 'for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish till death them do part according to
God's holy ordinance."' Sharswood, J., in Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196 (i881).
"There is in general no safe rule but this: that persons who marry agree to take
each other as they are." Ruffin, J., in Scroggins v. Scroggins, 3 Dev. 535 (N. C.
1832).

i Bishop, Marriage, D., & S. §479 and cases cited.
4Moss v. Moss, L. R. (1897) P. 263.
6 Prudham v. Phillips, I Harg. Law Tracts, 456, note; Lord C. J. Tindal.
in Reg. v. Millis, xo Cl. & F. 534, 671.
6supra, note 4.
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where it was held that fraudulent concealment by a woman from
her husband at -the time of their marriage of the fact that she is
then pregnant by another man is not ground for annulment.
This view being "wholly unsuited to the present state of
civilization and the -prevailing ideas of juridicial justice"7 was
early depafted from in this country. Marriage is considered a
civil contract and every fraud in a material part will-avoid it.
But because of public policy and the peculiar nature of the marriage
contract nothing is deemed material unless it relates to an "essentilia" of the marriage relation.9 Character, name, fortune, family,
not being "essential to the very existence of the marriage relation,"9 are not within the rule.w
As a logical consequence of this rule it is uniformly held that
misrepresentation or concealment of antenuptial unchastity is no
ground for annulment." However, an important exception was
soon established in Reynolds v. Reynolds" where it was held that
the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of nullity because he was
induced to marry defendant by her false and fraudulent representations that she was chaste, whereas she was at the time of
the marriage pregnant by another man. Pressed with the objection that this was merely a case of antenuptial incontinence the
court dlistingtuished the case before them on two grounds: - (I)
temporary impotence, in that she was not able to bear her husband
a child at the time of the marriage; (2) that by virtue of the presumption of legitimacy the spurious offspring would become his
presumptive heir. As to the latter it may be said that the" same
evidence that will entitle the husband to a decree of nullity will
enable him to establish the illegitimacy of the offspring.1" Such
marital right in the husband as set forth in the former is of doubtful validity since temporary impotence is no cause for dissolution."
7Gatto v. Gatto, supra, per Walker, J.

9 Reynolds v.: Reynolds, 3 Allen 605 (Mass. 1862); Leavitt v. Leavitt,
13 Mich. 452 (i865); Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. 516 (1873); Allen's Appeal,
99 Pa. 106 (Mi88); Lyon v. Lyon, 230 II1. 366 (1907); Trask v. Trask, 114 Me.
6o (915); Millar v. Millar, 167 Pac. 394 (Cal. 1917).
9 Angellotti, C. J., in Millar v. Millar, supra.
10 Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa 707 (1870); Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Repr.

561 (1878); Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124 (189o); Williamson v. Williamson, 34
App. D. C. 536 (i91o).
31Leavitt v. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452 (1865); Smith v. Smith, 8 Ore. IO (1879);

Varney v. Varney,

(52
Wis. 120 (8

Rothmai
.);
v. Rothman, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep.

245 (1912); Hull v. Hull,191 1ll. App.307 (1915).

"' supra, note 8. There were two earlier cases: Morris v. 'Morris, Wright
163o (Ohio r834); Baker v. Baker, x13Cal. 87 (1859).
11Hargrave v. Hargrave, g Beav. 549 (0846); Dennison, v. Page, 29 Pa.
.420,72 Am. Dec. 644 (18.57); WVoodward v. Blue, 107 N. C. 407 (189o); Wallace v.
Wallace, 1.37 Iowa 37 (1908).
"Ferris v. Ferris. 8 Conn. 166 (183o); Anonymous, 35 Ala. 226 (1859);
1G. v. G., 33 Md. 401 (1870); Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 6 Paige 175 (N. Y. 1836).
The stipulation of the marriage contract is for copula, not fruitfulness. Even
impotence of copula. if curable, is not a ground of nullity. Nor is it different
though the woman has, by her own voluntary fault or wickedness, 'incapacitated
herself."' z Bishop, Marriage, D., & S. §49o.

NOTES

Besides it is fair to predict that the courts would not extend this
theory to every type of temporary disability.11
The unsatisfactory reasoning upon which this exception is
supported6 and the uniformity with which it has been followed, t7
conclusively demonstrate the inadequacy of the general rule.
"And as mere incontinence in a woman prior to her entrance
into the marriage contract, not resulting in pregnancy, does not
necessarily prevent her from being a faithful wife, or from bearing
to her husband the pure offspring of his loins, there seems to be no
sufficient reason for holding misrepresentation or concealment on
the subject of chastity to be such a fraud as to afford a valid ground
for declaring a consummated marriage void."18 From this we
necessarily infer that fidelity and capacity for procreating "pure
offspring" are the only "essentilia" in the marriage relation. It
is certainly startling to hear that as far as the essentials of the
marriage relation are concerned there is no difference between
common strumpets and those who are most dear to us. Yet it
is obvious that precisely this limitation is necessary if we desire
to exclude antenuptial incontinence from the rule.
Why public policy and the peculiar nature of the relation
demand this exclusion is not quite clear. On the one hand we
are told that "if antenuptial incontinence be a sufficient ground
of nullity as against the woman, it is not easy to see why it should
not be so likewise against the man, and the consequences of such
a doctrine it is not difficult to predict."" But the point is not
that antenuptial incontinence but that fraudulent representations
on that subject shall be ground for annulment. The two are quite
different, and objections to the one do not necessarily apply to
the other. Again, we are cautioned that any other law would lead
to carelessness and blind credulity on the part of those contemplating marriage.2 But "nothing born of the law will prevent
11 For instance to the case of a disability which can be removed by a slight
surgical operation, as in Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 6 Paige 175 (N. Y. z836)
or one otherwise curable as in Anonymous, 158 N. Y. S. 51 (1916). There was
no fraud in either case.
16 Bishop, 'Marriage, D., & S. §494: "The true iev plainly is, that here
is a cord of several strands, no one of which has strength enough to sustain the
heavy consequence when put upon it alone. But, duly combined, they do sustain it." It is difficult to understand how those two bad reasons make one
good one.
aTMurris v. 'Morris, Wright 630 (Ohio 1834); Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87
(1859); Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. 516 (1873); Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196
(188i);" 'McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 Tex. 682 (z888); Harrison v. Harrison.
94 Mich. 559 (1893); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 57 N. J. Eq. 222 (1898); Wallace v.
Wallace, 137 Iowa 37 (19o8); Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399 (1916); Gard v.
Gard, 169 N. NV. 908 (Mich. 1918); Ritayik v. Ritayik, 213 S. W. 83.(Mo. 1919);
Cf. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 3 Dev. 535 (N. C. 1832); Barden v. Barden, 3 Dev.
548 (N. C. 1832).
i Bigelow, C. J., in Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra.
'Sharswood, J., in Allen's Appeal, supra.
20 Avery, J., in Meyer v. Meyer, supra.
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indiscreet and unsuitable marriages."21 If another theory may
place a premium on hasty marriages, the above view does put a
premium on fraud.
Since opinions as to what is essential to matrimonial happiness
differ, why not let the parties themselves stipulate for what they
deem essential? A plaintiff comes into court with the complaint
that by a fraud prdctised upon him he has been induced to marry
a kleptomaniac,2 a woman divorced for adultery, = one who had
lived with another as his mistress,-4 a professional tbief,2 or, as
in the principal case, one guilty of incest. Shall the court, in a
matter so vital to his happiness, say to -him: "What signifies what
you intend? The law intends otherwise." 26 And if it is a definite
rule that is sought it is readily obtained by ignoring the questionable dictates of public policy and declaring that every fraud that
vitiates an ordinary contract avoids a contract of marriage. This
is the logical result of regarding marriage as a ci ril contract. Its
recognition requires the same honesty of those who marry as of
those who enter into any other contract. That is the law in New
York." By adopting this rule in the principal case the New Hampshire court has taken a sane view of a situation that is much in
need of wise adjudication.
H. P.
2 MeAdam. J., in Keyes v. Keyes, 6 N. Y. Misc. 355 (1893).
2 Lewis v. Lewis, 41 Minn. i24 (189o).
2 Trask v. Trask, Ii4 Me. 61 (915).
2 Bahrenburg v. Bahrenburg, i5o N. Y. S. 589 (1914).
22Keyes v. Keyes, 6 N. Y. Misc. 355 (1893).
25 Denison, J., in Edie v. East India Co., I Win. 131. 295 (1761).
27 Keyes v. Keyes, 6 N. Y. Misc. 355 (1893); di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo,
174 N. Y. 467 (19o3); Robert v. Robert, 15o N. Y. Supp. 366 (1914); Bahrenburg v. Bahrenburg, i5o N. Y. Supp. 589 (1914); Libman v. Libman, x69 N. Y.
Supp. 9oo, 1o2 Misc. Rep. 443 (1918).

